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TonTs-LmEL AND SLANDER-ABsoLuTE PRIVILEGE To PREss RBLBAsBs oP

OFF1CIALs-Defendant, Attorney General for the state of Pennsylvania, wrote a letter to a District Attorney demanding the dismissal of the
plaintiff, an Assistant District Attorney, because of the plaintiff's alleged communistic activities and associations, information of which had been brought to
the attention of the defendant by the State Police. Before delivery of the letter
to the District Attorney, the defendant released it to the newspapers. Plaintiff
brought a libel action alleging the statements to be false and maliciously made.
The defendant demurred and the court sustained. On appeal, held, affirmed. Although the defendant himself has no power to dismiss or to compel the dismissal of the plaintiff, the letter supplying information about the plaintiff was
written within the scope of his powers, and it is in the public interest that he
keep the public advised of his official acts; therefore, release of the letter to the
press is absolutely privileged. Matson 11. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. (2d)
892 (1952).
The rationale of the doctrine of absolute privilege, which affords complete
immunity to defamatory statements made by certain classes of people, is based on
a public policy which insures freedom of speech where it is essential to the general public interest.1 Absolute privilege in libel actions was originally limited
to judicial and legislative proceedings, and to communications made by military
and naval officers.2 Later, in the leading case of Spalding 11. Vilas/! it was extended
to heads of executive departments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law, and has since been further extended to include subor-
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dinate government officials.4 This appears to he the prevailing view among both
federal and state courts with regard to official communications of executive
officials. 5 On the general question of whether or not press releases of these
officials should he absolutely privileged, the courts are somewhat divided. Some
courts have treated them as official communications coming within the rule of
the Spalding case, viz., official communications of executive officials when made
in the exercise of duties imposed upon them by law are absolutely privileged,
and if there is any doubt that it is an official communication, an absolute privilege may he granted on the ground that the public interest in the acts of the
official creates a duty on his part to inform the puhlic.6 Courts following this
view require a fairly substantial public interest, and will consider the status of
the official and the importance of the matter. 7 Other courts tend to con£.ne the
application of absolute privilege in press releases by requiring the act of the
official to he clearly within the scope of his authority, and appear reluctant to
use the "duty to inform the public" theory to reach a different result 8 Assume
the communication to he of an official character, and that the case arises in a
jurisdiction following what might he termed the broader application of absolute privilege, should the result he any different if the communication is released

4 DeAmaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D.C. 167 (1904); Miles v. McGrath, (D.C. Md.
1933} 4 F. Supp. 603.
5 Love v. Snyder, (6th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 840; Catron v. Jasper, 303 Ky. 598,
198 S.W. (2d) 322 (1946); Powers v. Vaughan, 312 Mich. 297, 20 N.W. (2d) 196
(1945); Donner v. Francis, 255 ill. App. 409 (1930); Stivers v. Allen, 115 Wash. 136,
196 P. 663 (1921). Contra: Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S.W. 878 (1910);
Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 129 N.W. 147 (1910); Ranson v. West, 125 Ky.
457, 101 s.w. 885 (1907).
6 In Glass v. Ickes, 73 App. D.C. 3, 117 F. (2d) 273 (1940), the Secretary of the
Interior issued a press release, allegedly containing defamatory statements, in which he
informed the public that the plaintiff had been barred from handling claims before the
Department of Interior. The court held the press release to be within the scope of the
Secretary's duties and therefore absolutely privileged, the then Ju,stice Vinson saying in the
footnote at 277-278: " ... such announcements serve a useful if not essential role in the
functioning of the democratic processes of government." One may have difficulty understanding what useful purpose the defendant's press release in the principal case served. See
also Schlinkert v. Henderson, 331 Mich. 284, 49 N.W. (2d) 180 (1951) (public interest
in the reorganization of personnel in the liquor control commission) and Ryan v. Wilson,
231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941) (public interest in the receivership division of the
state department of banking).
7 Colpoys v. Gates, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 16. The court reasoned that a
marshal had no duty to reveal to the public the results of an investigation of charges made
against his deputies, and so was not absolutely privileged when doing so, distinguishing
the functions of a marshal from those of a cabinet officer, who has political functions to
perform and who should not be subject to libel suits when explaining his acts and policies
publicly.
s Murray v. Brancato, 290 N.Y. 52, 48 N.E. (2d) 257 (1943). Though involving a
member of the judiciary rather than an executive official, the issue presented was the same,
the court holding that a judge who is under a statutory duty to deliver to the State Reporter
copies of his opinions, but who instead sends copies of his opinion to the New York Law
Journal and New York Supplement with a request that they be published is not acting
within his judicial authority; consequently the publication was not official and therefore
not absolutely privileged,
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to the press prior to its delivery to the one who is to receive it? The authorities
on this precise question are few, but the inquiry has been given some treatment
by courts passing on the issue of whether or not to grant an absolute privilege
to the communication of an official. A federal court:9 applying the rule of the
Spalding case held a communication absolutely privileged on the assumption
that it was delivered to the addressee prior to its release to the press, thus leaving
open the question of what effect an advance release of the letter would have had
on the result. 10 The Pennsylvania court is one of the few courts which has
faced this exact question and held that the absolute privilege given to the
heads of executive departments over their official communications remains unaffected by a release of the letter to the press prior to its receipt by the addressee11 However one might abhor such a practice, it is difficult to understand
why the result should be any different since an absolute privilege by its very
nature is not affected by excessive publication.12 Courts should, however, weigh
seriously any extension of the privilege, for to cloak executive officials with this
immunity, especially as in the principal case where the authority to write the
letter in the first instance was seriously questioned, may easily lead to great abuse
in the hands of the unprincipled. A bestowal of this privilege on the theory
that there is a duty to inform the public because of the public interest in the
matter presents the serious problem of drawing the line between matters which
are of public interest and those which are not. Examination of the authorities
indicates a reluctance on the part of numerous courts to extend the doctrine of
absolute privilege,13 and raises considerable doubt if they would reach the same
result as did the Pennsylvania court if faced with the same question. The better
rule would seem to be to apply a qualified privilege to such press releases, and
accord absolute immunity only in those rare situations where, for compelling
reasons of public policy, it is desirable that the executive official be left free to
communicate to the general public without being subject to civil suit.

Constantine D. Kasson
9 Mellon v. Brewer, 57 App. D.C. 126, 18 F. (2d) 168 (1927), cert. den. 275 U.S.
530, 48 S.Ct. 28 (1927).
10 Cf. Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 96 N.E. 84 (1911).
11 In Ryan v. Wilson, 231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941), the court held absolutely
privileged a report released to the press by the Governor prior to its delivery to the Attorney
General.
12 Where a qualified privilege is available, it must be exercised in a reasonable manner,
so deliberate adoption of a method of communication which gives unnecessary publicity to
defamatory statements may be an abuse of the privilege, resulting in its forfeiture. See
PROSSER, TORTS §94 (1941).
13 Laun v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, (Mo. 1943) 166 S.W. (2d) 1065; Pecue
v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 135 N.E. 515 (1922).

